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The Availability of a Jury Trial in Federal
Courts: Suits Against Foreign Sovereign-
Owned Instrumentalities
By MARTHA M. PODOLAK
Member of the Class of 1983
I. INTRODUCTION
The Second, Third, and Fourth Federal Circuits recently ex-
amined the issue of whether a jury trial is available in a suit against a
foreign sovereign-owned instrumentality. Because each of the three
cases, Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A.,' Williams v. Shopping Corp.
of India,' and Ruggiero v. Compania Pervana de Vapores "'Inca Capac
Yupanquiz involved essentially the same facts and reached basically
the same decision, though in one instance via a different legal route,
they will be considered here as a unit.'
In Rex, plaintiff, a longshoreman, brought a negligence action to
recover damages pursuant to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for injuries sustained while unload-
ing the cargo of a merchant vessel owned by a Peruvian corporation.5
Included in the plaintiffs complaint was a request for a jury trial.
Similarly, in Williams, plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for
personal injuries allegedly incurred while he was working as a long-
1. 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981) (Sloviter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
2. 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
3. 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981).
4. The typical fact pattern involved in cases in this area is as follows: A foreign sover-
eign-owned instrumentality (usually a corporation) has allegedly committed some wrong
within the context of its commercial activities in the United States (or having a direct effect
in the United States), and a United States plaintiff has been injured. During the course of
the suit, the plaintiff makes a motion for a jury trial which the defendant instrumentality
opposes.
5. The stock of the Peruvian corporation was wholly owned by the Government of
Peru. 660 F.2d at 62. Thus, the corporation qualified as a "foreign state" as defined in 28
U.S.C. § 1603 (1976), which includes any corporate entity owned or controlled by a foreign
state. In Williams and Ruggiero, the defendant corporations likewise qualified as "foreign
states" within the meaning of § 1603. 639 F.2d at 873; 653 F.2d at 876.
6. 660 F.2d at 62.
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shoreman aboard defendant's ship. Defendant, a corporation wholly
owned by the Government of India, removed the case to federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) and moved to strike plaintiff's demand
for a jury trial.7 Ruggiero involved three consolidated damage actions
brought by longshoremen pursuant to the LHWCA for injuries sus-
tained due to the alleged negligence of three shipowners. In each case,
the defendant was a shipping company wholly owned by a foreign gov-
ernment-specifically, Peru, Poland, and Indonesia. Each plaintiff
properly requested a jury trial, and a motion to strike the jury demand
was made by each respective defendant.8
The courts in Rex, Williams, and Ruggiero examined three basic
issues: (1) whether all actions brought pursuant to the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 19769 (FSIA or Act), specifically pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1330(a), must be tried by a court without a jury; (2) whether
the FSIA is the sole basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction in civil
actions against agencies or instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns; and
(3) if the FSIA indeed precludes a jury trial, whether the Act is consti-
tutional in light of the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury trial. t '
Each of the respective circuit courts resolved these issues in the
affirmative. "
7. 653 F.2d at 876-77.
8. 639 F.2d at 873.
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976) (amending §§ 1332, 1391, and 1441). For a
general overview of the FSIA, see Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass,
34 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1982); Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corpora.
tions.- Sovereign Immunity (pts. 1-5), 85 COM. L.J. 167, 228, 298, 364, 497 (1980); Carl, Suing
Foreign Governments in American Courts.- The United States Foreign Sovereign Immuntles
Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009 (1979); Kahale & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward
a Uniform Body of Law ln Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L, 211
(1979); von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 33 (1978); Delaume, Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity The Foreign Sovereign
ImmunitiesAct o/ 1976, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 399 (1977); Note, Sovereign Immunity-LIts of
Judicial Control- The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429
(1977); Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976--Judicial Predominance, 4
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 146 (1977); Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 Giv-
ing the Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 543 (1977); Note, International
Law-Act of State Doctrine: Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV. 318 (1977).
10. The Seventh Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
11. Recent articles examining the question of the availability of a jury trial in suits
brought pursuant to the FSIA include: Kane, supra note 9, at 421-24; Dellapenna, supra
note 9, at 499-501; Recent Developments, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Jury Trials-
Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 698 (1981); Note, .irlsdiction and
Jury Triais in Actions 4gainst Foreign Government Owned Corporations, 38 WASH, & LcE L.
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Although there was unanimity in the results reached in these three
cases on the basic issues, a strong dissent by Judge Sloviter in Rex
12
and contrary results in four district court opinions13 indicate that the
question of whether there is a right to a jury trial in a suit under the
FSIA is controversial and unsettled.
14
This Note will examine the arguments of the three circuit courts in
deciding to withhold a jury trial in suits against foreign sovereign-
owned corporations. It is the basic premise of this Note that the cases
were wrongly decided. Though the courts correctly assessed congres-
sional intent to deprive United States litigants of a jury trial, they failed
to recognize that the FSIA unconstitutionally violates the Seventh
Amendment guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases.
I. BACKGROUND: SETTING THE STAGE
A. Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns Prior to the FSIA
In 1812, the United States Supreme Court, in The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon,'5 held that foreign sovereigns were immune from
suit in United States courts, thus articulating a policy of absolute sover-
eign immunity.' 6 In Schooner Exchange, the Court dismissed an action
REv. 1211 (1981); Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Seventh Amendment: Recogniz-
ing the Right to Jury Trial in Suits Against Foreign States and State-Owned Corporations, 21
VA. J. INTL L. 521 (1981); Note, Ruggiero v. Compania Pervana de Vapores and Rex v. Cia.
Pervana de Vapores: Jury Preclusion in ActionsAgainst Foreign Sovereign-OwnedInstrumen.
talities, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 199 (1981) (discussing Ruggiero circuit court opinion
and Rex district court opinion); Note, Sovereign Immunio-The Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act Does Not Preclude Jury Trials Against Foreign Government-Owned Commercial Cor-
porations, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 219 (1980); Note, Sovereign lnumunity: Jury Trial -
Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 720 (1979).
12. 660 F.2d 61, 69-76 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
13. The following cases held that plaintiffis entitled to ajury trial under the FSIA: Rex
v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982); Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71
(D. Md. 1980), vacated, 667 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1982); Lonan v. Companhia de Navegacao
Lloyd Basileiro, 85 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, 82 F.R.D. 36
(D.D.C. 1979).
14. A tentative draft of the Restatement of Foreign Relations takes no position on
whether a right to jury trial exists in a suit against a foreign state. In a section discussing
commencement and venue of such actions, the Reporters' Notes cite without analysis the
Ruggiero circuit court opinion, 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981), the Rex district court opinion,
495 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1980), and the Williams district court opinion, 489 F. Supp. 526
(E.D. Va. 1980). RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTrrED STATES (RE-
VISED) § 457 Reporters' Notes, at 212 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
15. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
16. The concept of sovereign immunity has its historical roots in the rule par inparem
non habet imperium-no state can claim jurisdiction over another. The phrase appears to
1982]
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by United States citizens who alleged that their vessel had been wrong-
fully taken and converted into a war vessel by the French Government.
Basing the decision on the historical assumption of the "perfect equal-
ity and absolute independence of sovereigns,"' 17 the Court stated:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dig-
nity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the
jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory
only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immuni-
ties belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not ex-
pressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended
to him.'
8
Gradually, however, the courts, though still embracing the doc-
trine of absolute sovereign immunity, began to defer to State Depart-
ment determinations of foreign sovereign immunity.' 9 In two decisions
in the early 1940's, the Supreme Court expressed its view that it was the
judiciary's "duty" to comply with executive decisions in this area. The
Court reasoned in Exparte Republic ofPeru20 and Mexico v. Hoffman
2
1
that diplomatic negotiation was the appropriate means to deal with any
wrongs committed by foreign sovereigns and that avoidance of embar-
rassment to the United States in its foreign relations was of primary
importance.22
As commercial and trading activities on the international level in-
creased and as other nations began to modify their postures on sover-
eign immunity,23 concern for private litigants led to a modification in
have been coined in the 14th century by Bartolus, one of the first writers on 41ternational
law. Note, Sovereign Immunity: Limits of Judicial Control, supra note 9, at 431 n. 11. For a
historical examination of the concept of sovereignty, see J. MATTERN, CONCEPTS Or STATE,
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE JURISTIC
CONCEPTION OF THE STATE (1928).
17. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137.
18. Id The concept of absolute sovereign immunity was further refined in United
States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875).
19. Von Mehren, supra note 9, at 40-41.
20. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
21. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
22. 318 U.S. at 588-89; 324 U.S. at 34-35. In Republic of Peru, the Court stated that
"our national interest will be better served in such cases if the wrongs to suitors, involving
our relations with a friendly foreign power, are righted through diplomatic negotiations
rather than by the compulsions of judicial proceedings." 318 U.S. at 589. In Hogpian, the
Court noted that "it is a guiding principle in determining whether a court should exercise or
surrender [to the State Department] its jurisdiction in such cases, that the courts should not
so act as to embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs." 324 U.S. at 35.
23. According to the Tate letter, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 984-85 (1952), most nations,
[Vol. 6
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the policy of absolute sovereign immunity.24 This change was initiated
in 1952 when the State Department issued the now-famous "fate let-
ter,"' 5 announcing an end to immunity for foreign sovereigns in suits
arising out of commercial or private, as opposed to public, activities.
Although the Tate letter did not suggest any guidelines for distinguish-
ing between commercial and public acts, two primary tests were formu-
lated by the courts, one focusing on the nature of the act and the other
on thepurpose of the act. 6
Along with the adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign im-
munity, the State Department promulgated administrative procedures,
which included an informal hearing complete with oral argument and
the submission of briefs, to determine whether a foreign state would be
accorded sovereign immunity. 7 During this period, the courts without
further inquiry entertained the defense of sovereign immunity merely
upon the recommendation of the State Department.2 1 If the State De-
except for the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, followed a theory of restrictive, rather
than absolute, sovereign immunity before 1952. Prior to the adoption of the FSIA, several
international conventions had incorporated the restrictive approach to sovereign immunity:
(1) the European Convention of State Immunity, signatories to which included Austria,
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom; (2) the Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to the mmunity of State-Owned Vessels; and (3) the Treaty of Peace with Ger-
many. Von Mehren, supra note 9, at 38 & n.24, 39 n.25; Note, JudicialPredominance,supra
note 9, at 153 n.58.
24. Kahale & Vega, supra note 9, at 212.
25. 26 U.S. DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 985 (1952).
26. Kahale & Vega, supra note 9, at 212-13. A third test was devised in Victory Trans-
port Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). An act was found to be public or political, thus
entitling the sovereign to immunity, only if it fit into one of the following categories:
(1) Internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien;
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces;
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity; and
(5) public loans.
Id at 360; Kahale & Vega, supra note 9, at 212-13.
27. Von Mehren, supra note 9, at 41.
28. Note, Sovereign Immunity-Decision of the State Department to Recognize and411ow
Claim of Sovereign Immunity Precludes Jurisdiction f.4merican Courts and Is Not Subject to
Review Under Administrative Procedure Act, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 215, 216-17 & nn.14-15
(1974); Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President
of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba,
S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). The court in Spacil explained this point: "The precedents
are overwhelming. For more than 160 years American courts have consistently applied the
doctrine of sovereign immunity when requested to do so by the executive branch. Moreover,
they have done so with no further review of the executive's determination. . . .' 489 F.2d
at 617.
19821
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partment failed to respond, either positively or negatively, to a foreign
sovereign's petition for immunity, the court would make its own deter-
mination. Great weight would, however, be accorded the State Depart-
ment's inaction.29 The predominance of the State Department in this
area was highly criticized not only because of the obviously political
influences which made objective decisions unlikely, but also because
restrictive immunity was applied inconsistently.
30
The need to depoliticize this area of decision-making t and to deal
with other problems surrounding the law of sovereign immunity, such
as the great difficulty involved in executing judgments against foreign
sovereigns, led Congress in 1973 to begin consideration of the FSIA. 
3 2
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
1. Overview
The FSIA, examined in terms of its broadest functions, does two
things: (1) it establishes jurisdiction of the United States district courts
over foreign states and their political subdivisions, agencies, and instru-
mentalities; and (2) it prescribes the circumstances in which foreign
29. Kahale & Vega, supra note 9, at 216 n. 27.
30. Id at 216.
31. In discussing the need to depoliticize at the congressional hearings on H. 3493,
Charles N. Bower, Legal Advisor of the Department of State, noted:
We at the Department of State are now persuaded ... that the foreign relations
interests of the United States as well as the rights of litigants would be better served
if these questions of law and fact were decided by the courts rather than by the
executive branch .... Indeed, State Department involvement can be detrimental
because some foreign state may be led to believe that since the decision can be
made by the executive branch it should be strongly affected by foreign policy con-
siderations. Consequently, foreign states are sometimes inclined to regard a deci-
sion by the State Department refusing to suggest immunity as a political decision
unfavorable to them rather than a legal decision .... Transfer of the decision-
making process to the courts, I think, will insure that sovereign immunity questions
are decided on legal grounds under procedures guaranteeing due process. This in
turn should better insure the consistency of decisions and reduce their foreign pol-
icy consequences.
A Bill to Define the Circumstances in which Foreign States Are Immune From the Jurisdiction
of the United States Courts and in Which Execution May Not be Levied on Their Asse, and
For Other Purposes: Hearings on H. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governnental
Relations of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1973).
32. For a discussion of the first bills considered by Congress, S. 566 and H.R. 3493, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (which were later revised, resubmitted in 1975 as S. Res. 3553 and
H.R. Res. 1315, and passed by Congress), see Note, Sovereign Immunity - Proposed Statu-
tory Elimination of State Department Role - Attachment, Service of Process, and Execution,
15 H v. INT'L L.J. 157 (1974); Note, The Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns in U.S. Courts.,
Proposed Legislation, 6 INT'L L. & POL. 473 (1973); Note, The Statutory Proposal to Regulate
the Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 549 (1973).
[Vol, 6
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states and their political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities
will be entitled to sovereign immunity in both state and federal
courts.3 It is important to recognize that the FSIA neither creates new
causes of action nor establishes legal rights or remedies. It is primarily
a jurisdictional enactment.
34
In meeting its general aims, the Act accomplishes four objectives:
(1) it codifies the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity;35 (2) it trans-
fers the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive to the
judiciary in order to "reduce the foreign policy implications of immu-
nity determinations" and assure "litigants that... decisions are made
on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due pro-
cess";36 (3) it provides a statutory procedure for service of process and
for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a foreign state;37 and (4) it
eliminates the absolute immunity from execution which foreign states
previously enjoyed.38
2. Relevant Provisions39
With certain exceptions, the FSIA codifies a presumption of sover-
eign immunity for foreign states.4° A foreign state is defined to include
a foreign sovereign, its political subdivisions, and its agencies and
instrumentalities. 41
33. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
AD. NEWS 6604, 6604 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
34. The Second Circuit made this point in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982):
There is no intent [in the FSIA] ... to create new federal causes of action; the
purpose of the Act instead is to provide "access to the courts in order to resolve
ordinary legal disputes." House Report at 6605 (emphasis added). The House Re-
port states flatly- "The bill is not intended to affect the substantive law of liability."
Id at 6610 .... Congress here intended to "create" no cause of action....
Id at 326.
35. HousE REPORT, supra note 33, at 7.
36. Id
37. Id at 8.
38. Id
39. The FSIA has various provisions which are beyond the scope of this Note. The
focus here is on the relevant jurisdictional and procedural provisions which give rise to the
question of the availability of a jury trial under the Act.
40. Dellapenna, supra note 9, at 169.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976). For the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), see 'nfra note 62.
Section 1603(b) defines an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state to mean any entity.
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a ma-
jority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or
political subdivison thereof, and
1982]
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The presumption of immunity is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1604, sub-
ject to the exceptions provided in sections 1605 to 1607.42 The relevant
exception for the purposes of this Note is section 1605(a)(2),43 which
divests a foreign state of its immunity in cases involving commercial
activity having a specified jurisdictional nexus44 with the United
States.4 A commercial activity is defined as "either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act."
46
The legislative history indicates that this definition is intentionally gen-
eral in order to allow the courts "a great deal of latitude in determining
what is a 'commercial activity' for the purposes" of the Act.47 Exam-
ples provided by Congress include: (1) a foreign government's sale of a
service or a product; (2) its leasing of property; (3) its borrowing of
money; (4) its employment of laborers, clerical staff, or public relations
or marketing agents; or (5) its investment in a security of a United
States corporation.48 Congress did, however, prescribe that the courts
are to look to the "nature" of the activity, rather than its "purpose," to
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section
1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1976).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). Specifically, § 1604 provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976). Specifically, § 1605(a)(2) provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or
upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States.
44. For articles discussing the jurisdictional nexus requirements, see Note, Direct Effect
Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 13 INT'L L. & POL. 571
(1981); Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Foreign States.- The "Direct Effect" Provision
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of.1976: Carey v. National Oil Corporation, 13 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 633 (1979).
45. Section 1605 provides other exceptions to the presumption of immunity in cases
involving: (1) waivers of immunity; (2) certain claims arising out of foreign expropriations;
(3) rights in property in the United States acquired by gift or succession, or rights in immov-
able property located in the United States; (4) certain noncommercial tort claims; and
(5) certain admiralty claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1), 1605(a)(3)-(5), 1605(b) (1976).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).




determine whether an activity is public or commercial 49
Once it is determined that a foreign defendant is both a foreign
state and not immune from suit, a federal court has original jurisdiction
to hear the suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).5" If a defendant is
either not a foreign state, as defined in section 1603(a), or is entitled to
immunity because section 1605 is inapplicable, the suit must be dis-
missed by the court, provided jurisdiction is premised on section
1330(a). A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because the defendant is
entitled to sovereign immunity is determinative of the question of sov-
ereign immunity. Thus, a United States plaintiff who loses on the ques-
tion of jurisdiction in federal court cannot bring the same action in
state court.5 '
III. THE REX, WILLIAMS, AND RUGGIERO
DECISIONS
Against this background, it is appropriate to examine the Rex,
Williams, and Ruggiero circuit court decisions5 2 and the arguments
made by other courts which reached opposite results. The first two is-
sues the circuit courts discussed are intertwined and, for convenience,
will be considered together. These issues are: (1) whether Congress
intended actions brought under the FSIA to be tried without a jury,
and (2) whether the FSIA is the sole basis for subject matter jurisdic-
tion in civil actions against foreign sovereign-owned instrumentalities.
A. Section 1330(a): Exclusive Basis of Jurisdiction and Jury
Preclusion?
In considering the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), the Rex, Williams,
and Ruggiero courts reached the same conclusion: Congress intended
all actions against foreign states-particularly foreign state-owned in-
strumentalities--to be brought exclusively under section 1330(a) and to
49. Id See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
50. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section
1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title
or under any applicable international agreement.
51. House REPORT, supra note 33, at 13.
52. Analytically, the arguments presented by the Rex, Wiflams, and Ruggler courts
are virtually the same. Thus, in this Note there will be only one presentation of the reason-
ing of the courts in order to avoid unnecessary repetition. Where, however, it is necessary to
note differences in legal analysis, the decisions will be considered separately.
1982]
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be tried without a jury.53 The most persuasive argument the circuit
courts had to contend with was the one advanced by the four district
courts which had previously upheld a United States plaintiff's right to a
jury trial in a suit against a foreign sovereign-owned instrumentality.
5 4
The four district courts reached beyond section 1330(a) to find an alter-
native basis of jurisdiction in order to hold that jury trials are available
to United States plaintiffs. Such jurisdiction was required to reach the
desired result because section 1330(a) strictly limits the jurisdiction of
the district courts to "any nonjury civil action against a foreign state."
' s
As an alternative, the four district courts based jurisdiction either on
diversity grounds or the presence of a federal question. s6 In so doing,
the courts circumvented the strict prohibition on jury trials in section
1330(a).
In choosing diversity as an alternate ground for jurisdiction, the
district courts looked to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) as amended by the
FSIA. Prior to amendment, section 1332(a)(2) read:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof. . .
The FSIA amended section 1332(a)(2) as follows:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state .... 58
53. Rex, 660 F.2d at 65; Williams, 653 F.2d at 881; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 875-76.
54. Rex, 493 F. Supp. at 467; Houston, 87 F.R.D. at 73; Lonon, 85 F.R.D. at 73; Ice.
nogle, 82 F.R.D. at 38. In Rex (at the district court level), Houston, Lonon, and lcenogle, it
was held that the FSIA's grant of jurisdiction over nonjury actions against a foreign state
does not preclude a jury trial based on diversityjurisdiction where the defendant corporation
qualifies as both a "foreign state" and a "citizen or subject of a foreign state."
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
56. All four courts based their holdings on diversity grounds, See Rex, 493 F. Supp. at
467; Houston, 87 F.R.D. at 73; Lonon, 85 F.R.D. at 73; Icenogle, 82 F.R.D. at 38. In addi-
tion, the Rex district court cited the presence of a federal question as an alternative basis of
jurisdiction. 493 F. Supp. at 469. Federal question jurisdiction arose because the plaintiff
sought a federal remedy under the LHWCA. Id at 467.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1970) (emphasis added).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976).
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The district courts reasoned that the deletion of the term "foreign state"
from section 1332(a)(2) as amended was immaterial because prior to
the FSIA a corporation owned by a foreign government fell within this
section as a "citizen or subject of a foreign state," not as a "foreign
state." Furthermore, "foreign state" as used in the amended version of
section 1332(a)(2) was thought to mean foreign state as defined in sec-
tion 1603(a).59 Thus, the implication was that plaintiff had an option:
(1) he could sue a foreign corporation as a "citizen or subject of a for-
eign state" pursuant to section 1332(a)(2), thereby preserving his right
to a jury trial; or (2) he could sue the foreign corporation as a "foreign
state" pursuant to section 1330(a), thereby foregoing his right to a jury
trial.
60
The Rex, Wlliams, and Ruggiero courts rejected the statutory ma-
neuvering of the district courts and instead cited several factors as pro-
viding a clear indication of congressional intent to make section
1330(a), with its proscription of jury trials, the exclusive basis of federal
jurisdiction.
First, the circuit courts indicated that the FSIA was intended to be
a comprehensive revision of the law regarding suits against foreign
governments and related entities. The legislative scheme affords plain-
tiffs a means to commence suits against a foreign state and its instru-
mentalities, provides firm standards as to when a foreign state may
validly invoke the defense of sovereign immunity, and establishes pro-
cedures for the execution of judgment.61
Second, the appellate courts disapproved of the anomaly, accepted
by the lower courts, that the same entity can be both a foreign state and
a citizen or subject of a foreign state. Rather, they pointed to the defi-
nition of a foreign state in section 160362 as destroying the fiction that a
corporation is a citizen or subject of a foreign state.63
Third, the circuit courts made reference to the plain language of
both section 1330(a) and section 1441(d), allowing removal to federal
courts of actions filed against foreign sovereigns in state court. Section
59. See infra note 62. Rex, 493 F. Supp. at 467; Houston, 87 F.ILD. at 73; Lonon, 85
F.R.D. at 72-73; Icenogle, 82 F.R.D. at 39.
60. See Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 875.
61. Rex, 660 F.2d at 63; Williams, 653 F.2d at 878; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 873. See
HousE REPORT, supra note 33, at 7.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976). Specifically, § 1603(a) provides:
A "foreign state," except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a polit-
ical subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
as defined in subsection (b).
63. Williams, 653 F.2d at 881; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 873. See Rex, 660 F.2d at 64.
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1330(a) confers jurisdiction over nonjury civil actions, and section
1441(d) states that "upon removal the action shall be tried by the court
without a jury.' 64 The courts reasoned that the express terms of these
two provisions clearly manifest a congressional intent to prohibit jury
trials, thus requiring section 1330(a) to be the exclusive jurisdictional
base.6 5
Finally, the courts relied on the legislative history of the FSIA as
evidence of Congress unambiguous purpose to proscribe jury trials by
making section 1330(a) the sole basis for jurisdiction. A factor thought
significant by the courts 66 and stressed in the legislative history was the
need for uniformity in decision-making "since a disparate treatment of
cases involving foreign governments may have adverse foreign rela-
tions consequences. ' '67 Trying suits by a court rather than a jury was
thought to be an important means for promoting the desired uniform-
ity. With specific reference to section 1330(a), the House Report states:
"Actions tried by a court without jury will tend to promote a uniform-
ity in decision where foreign governments are involved. 6 8 Regarding
section 1441(d), the House Report noted that "[i]n view of the potential
sensitivity of actions against foreign states and the importance of devel-
oping a uniform body of law in this area, it is important to give foreign
states clear authority to remove to a Federal forum actions brought
against them in the State courts.
69
Further proof for the courts' literal interpretation of the statutes is
also provided. In the discussion of section 1330(a), the House Report
states, "As in suits against the U.S. Government, jury trials are ex-
cluded. ' 70 Regarding section 1441(d), the House Report provides:
Upon removal, the action would be heard and tried by the ap-
propriate district court sitting without a jury. (Cf. 28 U.S.C. 2402,
precluding jury trials in suits against the United States.) Thus, one
effect of removing an action under the new section 1441(d) will be to
extinguish a demand for a jury trial made in the state court.
7t
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as defined in sec-
tion 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of
the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such ac-
tion is pending. Upon removal the action shall be tried by the court without a jury.
65. Rex, 660 F.2d at 64; Williams, 653 F.2d at 881; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 875.
66. Rex, 660 F.2d at 65; Williams, 653 F.2d at 879; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 877.
67. HousE REPORT, supra note 33, at 13.
68. Id
69. Id at 32.
70. I1d at 13.
71. I at 33.
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Moreover, the legislative history of the FSIA directly explains
Congress change of section 1332(a)(2):
Section 3 of the bill amends those provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1332
which relate to diversity jurisdiction of U.S. district courts over for-
eign states. Since jurisdiction in actions against foreign states is com-
prehensively treated by the new section 1330, a similarftjrisdictional
basis under section 1332 becomes supeifluous. 2
Although the four district courts devised an innovative theory for
avoiding the denial of a jury trial, their statutory manipulation cannot
withstand scrutiny. The Rex, Williams, and Ruggiero courts cited clear
authority for the holding that section 1330(a) is jurisdictionally exclu-
sive and bars the plaintiff from a jury trial.73 Resolution of the statu-
tory issues in this manner is important because it requires direct
confrontation with the Seventh Amendment. 4 Although the Rex, Wil-
liams, and Ruggiero courts were able to reconcile the denial of a jury
trial with the Seventh Amendment, there are strong arguments which
compel the opposite result. Both sides of the controversy will be
analyzed.
B. Deprivation of a Jury Trial and the Seventh Amendment
1. Approach Taken by the Williams and Ruggiero Courts75
Faced squarely with the Seventh Amendment issue, the circuit
courts in Williams and Ruggiero adopted the "static" approach to the
Seventh Amendment, later expressly rejected by Rex.76 They reasoned
that the function of the Seventh Amendment is to preserve the right to
jury trial as it existed under the common law of England in 1791, the
72. Id at 14 (emphasis added).
73. The best summary of the impact of the FSIA is provided by Ruggiero:
The courts must learn to accept that, in place of the familiar dichotomy of federal
question and diversity jurisdiction, the Immunities Act has created a tripartite divi-
sion-federal question cases, diversity cases and actions against foreign states. If a
case falls within the third division, there is to be no jury trial even if it might also
come within one of the other two.
639 F.2d at 876.
74. The four district courts endeavored to construe the statute so as not to preclude jury
trials for the express purpose of avoiding the constitutional question. Rex, 493 F. Supp. at
466; Houston, 87 F.R.D. at 73; Lonon, 85 F.R.D. at 73; Icenogle, 82 F.R.D. at 40.
75. In their analyses of the Seventh Amendment question, the IIiams and Riggiero
decisions are analytically similar and, for purposes of this discussion, will be treated
together.
76. Rex, 660 F.2d at 66. In other words, the Williams and Ruggiero courts viewed jury
trials as being available only in actions recognized at common law in 1791. Id
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year the Amendment became effective.77 The courts' view was that the
Amendment does not extend the right to a jury trial to new types of
cases. Because the policy of absolute sovereign immunity protected
foreign governments from suits arising out of their commercial activi-
ties until the middle of the twentieth century,78 the courts reasoned that
no right of jury trial existed in similar cases in 1791. Thus, they con-
cluded that the Seventh Amendment is inapplicable to current suits
against foreign states.7 9
The Williams and Ruggiero courts also analogized suits against
foreign governments to suits against the United States. This analogy
was based upon past decisions holding that the denial of a jury trial in
suits against the United States does not violate the Seventh Amend-
ment because such actions are not suits at common law.80 Finally, the
courts reasoned that Congress denial of a jury trial in suits against for-
eign states was rational in light of the absence of civil juries in other
countries and "the fear that juries might draw too heavily on a deep
pocket."'"
77. Specifically, the test adopted by the Williams and Ruggiero courts for determining
whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial in a particular action is as follows:
[I]f the action is a common law suit or the particular issues arise in a common law
suit, but no right of jury trial existed under the common law of England as to that
type of action, then there is no right to jury trial by virtue of the Seventh
Amendment.
Williams, 653 F.2d at 881; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 879.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
79. Williams, 653 F.2d at 883; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 881.
80. Williams, 653 F.2d at 882; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 879. In McElrath v. United States,
102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880), the Supreme Court stated:
There is nothing in these provisions [denying a jury trial] which violates either the
letter or spirit of the Seventh Amendment. Suits against the government in the
Court of Claims, whether reference be had to the claimant's demand, or to the
defence, or to any set-off, or counter-claim which the government may assert, are
not controlled by the Seventh Amendment. They are not suits at common law
within its true meaning. The government cannot be sued, except with its own con-
sent. It can declare in what court it may be sued, and prescribe the forms of plead-
ing and the rules of practice to be observed in such suits.
This position was reaffirmed in Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388 (1943), where
the Court provided:
It may be noted, first, that the [Seventh] Amendment has no application of its own
force to this case. The suit is one to enforce a monetary claim against the United
States. It hardly can be maintained that under the common law in 1791 jury trial
was a matter of right for persons asserting claims against the sovereign.
See also Glidden Company v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 572 (1962).
81. Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 880. See Williams, 653 F.2d at 882-83. It is ironic that in one
of the only cases in which a judge and a jury concurrently decided a case under the FSIA,
the trial judge found the foreign defendant negligent and the plaintiff entitled to $443,000 in
damages, while the jury found the defendant innocent of any wrongdoing. Houston v. Mur-
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In adopting the view that the Seventh Amendment does not extend
a right to jury trial to new types of cases, two of the most difficult deci-
sions the appellate courts had to deal with were the United States
Supreme Court decisions in Curtis v. Loether8" and Pernell v. Southall
Realty.83 In Curtis, the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amend-
ment protects a defendant's right to a jury trial in an action for dam-
ages under the Civil Rights Act to redress violations of that Act's fair
housing provisions.84 Similarly, in Pernell the Court held that either
party in an action to recover possession of real property in the District
of Columbia has a right to a jury trial protected by the Seventh
Amendment. 5 The problem presented by these two cases was that the
right to jury trial was upheld on the basis of the Seventh Amendment
in cases unheard of at common law. The .Ruggiero court distinguished
Curtis and Pernell as holding
only that when Congress enlarges domestic substantive law or alters
procedure in cases governed by it, the Seventh Amendment protects
the right to jury trial if the new substantive right or proceeding is
analogous to a suit at common law in 1791.... They do not pur-
port to deal with the unusual situation where the bar to a suit at
common law was that the defendant, by virtue of its character as a
sovereign, was not suable at all.86
On the other hand, the Wl7liams court interpreted Curtis and Pernell as
merely reaffirming the
principle announced by Mr. Justice Story in Parsons v. Bedford...
that the term "suits at common law" as used in the Seventh Amend-
ment embraces "not merely suits, which the common law recognized
among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights
were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those
where equitable rights alone were recognized....
Thus, the Williams court concluded that to invoke the Seventh Amend-
ment, not only must the plaintiff's action be "legal" rather than mari-
time or equitable, but also it must be brought against a defendant who
mansk Shipping Company, 667 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1982) (because of the uncertainty re-
garding the requirement for nonjury trial, trial judge devised a novel procedure whereby the
jury would try the case, but the judge would also record his findings).
82. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
83. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
84. 415 U.S. at 191.
85. 416 U.S. at 363, 365.
86. 639 F.2d at 881 (citations omitted).
87. IMdliams, 653 F.2d at 883 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 PcL) 433, 446
(1830)).
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was suable at common law in 1791.88
2. The Rex Court's Approach
The Third Circuit in Rex did not view common law as frozen in
1791. Instead, it directly accounted for the Curtis and Pernell decisions
in setting its standard for determining the availability of a jury trial in a
suit against a foreign government.89 The Rex court framed its relevant
inquiry as whether the plaintiffs action "is in the nature of a legal rem-
edy similar to a suit at common law." 90 Reasoning that actions against
foreign governments never existed at common law, the Rex court con-
cluded that there was no Seventh Amendment violation in the FSIA's
denial of a jury trial since it "does not codify a preexisting cause of
action at common law." 91
As further support for its position, the Rex court equated domestic
and foreign sovereignty, as the Williams and Ruggiero courts had done.
The Rex court, however, extended the analogy between suits against
the United States government and foreign states a bit further. In Rex,
the plaintiff argued that because the damage remedy he sought was a
legal remedy, the Seventh Amendment guarantee to a jury trial was
applicable to his case. The Rex court was not persuaded and pointed
instead to Supreme Court cases holding that suits against the United
States, even when they are for monetary damages, do not require jury
trials. 9z In addition, the Court expressed its belief that Congress, by
limiting suits against foreign states to nonjury trials, was effectuating
legitimate foreign policy concerns for the avoidance of disruptions in
foreign relations and for the increase in the cooperation of foreign
states with the United States judicial process.
93
3. Criticism
Although at first glance the arguments of the Rex, Williams, and
Ruggiero courts appear to be convincing and conclusive, deeper analy-
sis shows that the opinions are based upon a misinterpretation of the
standards set forth in Curtis and Pernell for the determination of
whether a jury trial is required by the Seventh Amendment in a partic-
ular case. The Rex court came the closest to the correct standards in its
88. Id
89. 660 F.2d at 66.
90. Id. at 67.
91. Id at 68-69.
92. Id at 66-67.
93. Id. at 69.
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articulation of the relevant inquiry,94 but it failed to apply the stan-
dards it announced. Rather, the Rex court appears to have reframed
the relevant standards into whether there was a right to sue a foreign
government at common law.95 Thus, the Rex court, along with the
courts in Williams and Ruggiero , focused on the nature of the defend-
ant rather than the nature of the rights and remedies at issue.97 More-
over, the analogy between suits against the United States and foreign
governments is inappropriate.98 A detailed discussion of these and
other criticisms of the Rex, Williams, and Ruggiero decisions and an
examination of the points raised by Judge Sloviter's dissent in Rex are
now appropriate.
IV. DENIAL OF A JURY TRIAL IN SUITS AGAINST
FOREIGN STATES: A SEVENTH AMENDMENT
VIOLATION
A. The Seventh Amendment: Relevant Precedents99
Because the issue of the availability of a jury trial in a suit against
a foreign corporation turns on the scope and effect of the Seventh
Amendment, °° a brief review of the relevant history of this constitu-
tional provision is necessary.
The significance of the right to a civil jury trial in the United
States legal tradition should not be underestimated. The right itself can
be traced to the original Jamestown charter, and, by 1776, it existed in
each of the thirteen colonies.' 0 ' At the time of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, one of the primary grievances against England was the ex-
tensive use of vice-admiralty courts by the colonial administrators to
94. See supra text accompanying note 90.
95. 660 F.2d at 70 (dissenting opinion).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
97. Rex, 660 F.2d at 70 (dissenting opinion).
98. Id at 70-71.
99. For a general discussion of the Seventh Amendment, its background and history,
see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Colgrove
v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899); Parsons v.
Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830); Kane, Civil Jury Trial- The Case for Reasoned
Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 1 (1976); Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial- A
Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision M4faking, 70 Nw. U.L Rnv. 486 (1975);
Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639
(1973); Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L REv. 289
(1966).
100. For the text of the Seventh Amendment, see supra note 10.
101. Wolfram, supra note 99, at 655.
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circumvent the colonists' right to jury trial. 10 2
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of
this right. In Dimick v. Schiedt,10 3 the Court noted that
"[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance
and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized
with the utmost care.""' The Court in Jacob v. City of New York' 05
stated:
The right ofjury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and
fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is
protected by the Seventh Amendment. A right so fundamental and
sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the Constitution or pro-
vided by statute, should be jealously guarded by the courts.
10 6
While the thrust of the Seventh Amendment 0 7 was to preserve the
right to jury trial as it existed under English common law in 1791,10"
the United States Supreme Court has never required such a literal
reading of the Amendment.0 9 Rather, it has been long-settled that the
right extends beyond common law forms of action as recognized at that
time. "0 The classic explanation of this principle was given by Mr. Jus-
tice Story in 1830:
The phrase "common law," found in this clause, is used in con-
tradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurispru-
dence. . . .By common law, [the framers of the Amendment] ...
meant what the constitution denominated in the third article "law;"
not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old
and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be
ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equi-
table rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were ad-
ministered; or where, as in the admiralty, a mixture of public law,
and of maritime law and equity was often found in the same
suit. . . . In a just sense, the amendment then may well be con-
strued to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty
jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may as-
102. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 340 (dissenting opinion).
103. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
104. Id at 486.
105. 315 U.S. 752 (1942).
106. Id at 752-53.
107. For the text of the Seventh Amendment, see supra note 10.
108. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).




sume to settle legal rights." I
Curtis 12 and Pernell"3 dispel any doubt that contemporary causes
of action unheard of at common law are protected by the Seventh
Amendment guarantee of a jury trial. As indicated above, Curtis held
that the Seventh Amendment entitled defendants to a jury trial in an
action for damages under the fair housing provisions of the Civil
Rights Act." 4 The Court stated that
when Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an or-
dinary civil action in the district courts, where there is obviously no
functional justification for denying the jury trial right, a jury trial
must be available if the action involves rights and remedies of the sort
typically enforced in an action at law.1
15
The Court reemphasized this notion in Pernell, where it held that
the Seventh Amendment entitled either party to demand a jury trial in
an action to recover possession of real property under the District of
Columbia Code." 6 The Court indicated:
Whether or not a close equivalent to § 16-1501 existed in England in
1791 is irrelevant for Seventh Amendment purposes, for that Amend-
ment requires trial by jury in actions unheard of at common law,
provided that the action involves rights and remedies of the sort tradi-
tionally enforced in an action at law, rather than in an action in equity
or admiralty. 117
The Supreme Court guidelines are clearn in order to determine
whether a jury trial is required by the Seventh Amendment, the courts
must look to the nature of the action, specifically to whether the action
involves both rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an
action at law, rather than one in equity or admiralty. As Judge Sloviter
in his dissent in Rex pointed out, the error made by the courts in Rex,
Williams, and Ruggiero was that they looked to the nature of the de-
fendant rather than to the nature of the action to determine the availa-
bility of a jury trial in a suit against a foreign corporation." 8
The courts in Williams and Ruggiero injected into the analysis of
whether plaintiff's claim was "legal" the requirement that the defend-
111. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 446.
112. 415 U.S. at 193.
113. 416 U.S. at 374-75.
114. 415 U.S. at 191.
115. Id at 195 (emphasis added).
116. 416 U.S. at 376.
117. Id at 375 (emphasis added).
118. Rex, 660 F.2d at 70, 76. See supra notes 86-88, 95-97 and accompanying text.
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ant be one suable at common law in 1791.119 The Williams court stated
that to "invoke the Amendment, it is not enough that the nature of the
plaintiff's action is 'legal' rather than maritime or equitable; the action
must also be brought against a defendant who was suable at common
law in 1791." 12 In Ruggiero, the Second Circuit emphasized that Cur-
fis and Pernell "do not purport to deal with the unusual situation
where the bar to a suit at common law was that the defendant, by vir-
tue of its character as a sovereign, was not suable at all."'' The Rex
court, though stating that the "proper inquiry is. . .whether [plain-
tiff's] action is in the nature of a legal remedy similar to a suit at com-
mon law," concluded that to "answer this question, we must examine
the law relating to private actions against foreign sovereigns.' 22 Be-
cause the Rex court found that "[h]istory ...conclusively demon-
strates that actions against foreign sovereigns have never existed at
common law,"'' 23 it refused to conclude that "by codification [of the
FSIA] Congress has created a cause of action in the nature of a com-
mon law remedy."' 24
Had the three circuit courts looked to the nature of the plaintiffs'
actions, specifically to the rights and remedies each plaintiff sought to
enforce, the conclusion they should have reached is that the Seventh
Amendment provides a right to a jury trial in a suit against a foreign
sovereign-owned instrumentality when the underlying cause of action
would so require. Plaintiffs in all three cases brought an action pursu-
ant to the LHWCA to recover damages for injuries due to the alleged
negligence of each foreign defendant. 25  Clearly, the action they
brought is in the form of a traditional tort action at law. The right they
sought to enforce is a traditional right at law, ie., the right to be free
from personal injury caused by another's tortious conduct. The rem-
edy they sought-money damages-is a typical common-law rem-
edy. 26 As the Supreme Court recognized in Whitehead v. Shattuck, 27
119. Williams, 653 F.2d at 883; Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 881.
120. 653 F.2d at 883.
121. 639 F.2d at 881.
122. 660 F.2d at 67.
123. Id. at 68.
124. Id at 69.
125. Under the amended version of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976), a vessel
owner is no longer strictly liable for a longshoreman's injuries incurred while working on its
ship, under the theories of nondelegable duty, unseaworthiness, or respondeat satterior (for a
stevedore's negligence). 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). Rather, an owner is liable to an injured long-
shoreman only for injuries proximately caused by its own negligence. See Rex, 493 F. Supp.
at 464.
126. Rex, 660 F.2d at 70 (dissenting opinion); Rex, 493 F. Supp. at 465.
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It would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to state any general
rule which would determine, in all cases, what should be deemed a
suit in equity as distinguished from an action at law. .. ; but this
may be said, that where an action is simply for the. . . recovery of a
money judgment, the action is one at law.'
28
Thus, in Rex, Williams, and Ruggiero, the plaintiffs satisfied the two-
pronged requirement of Curtis and Pernell: their actions involved both
rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an action at law,
rather than one in equity or admiralty.
One difficulty the circuit court in Rex appeared to have when dis-
cussing the Seventh Amendment issue was that it ignored the lirisdic-
tional character of the FSIA. 12 9 Rather, it dealt with the statute as if it
codified a cause of action ,13° though in discussing the statutory issues,
the court clearly recognized the FSIA as a jurisdictional enactment.'
3 '
This inconsistency may be one reason for the court's misapplication of
the Curtis-Pernell standards.
B. Distinction Between Foreign Governments and Foreign
Government-Owned Corporations
Even if the defendant must be suable at common law in 1791 in
order for a jury trial right to exist, there remains a difficult constitu-
tional hurdle. The defendants in these cases are not traditional foreign
sovereigns. They are foreign government-owned corporations consid-
ered to be foreign states only by the operation of the FSIA. Because
such entities were rare if not nonexistent in 1791, there is a scarcity of
case law defining the status of government-owned commercial corpora-
tions. Thus, even if the treatment of foreign governments is ascertain-
127. 138 U.S. 146 (1891).
128. Id at 151. See also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970); Pernell, 416 U.S. at
370.
129. See supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
130. For example, in its discussion of the Seventh Amendment issues, the Rex court
stated, "[W]e cannot conclude that by codification Congress has created a cause of action in
the nature of a common law remedy.... Inasmuch as the FSIA does not codify a preexist-
ing cause of action at common law, that determination does not offend the seventh amend-
ment." 660 F.2d at 69. Not only does the FSIA not codify a "preexisting cause of action at
common law," it does not codify any cause of action-it is primarily jurisdictional. See
supra note 34. In addition, the legislative history indicates: "Section 1606 [of the FSIA]
makes clear that if the foreign state, political subdivision, agency or instrumentality is not
entitled to immnunityfrom jurisdiction, liability exists as it would for a private party under like
circumstances." HousE REPORT, supra note 33, at 22 (emphasis added).
131. Rex, 660 F.2d at 63-65.
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able at common law, the treatment of such corporate entities is not. 3 2
Later cases do, however, indicate that when foreign government-
owned entities began to flourish, a distinction developed between the
foreign sovereign itself and its ownership interests. Corporations were
not accorded sovereign immunity merely because they were owned by
foreign governments. 133 For example, as pointed out by Judge Sloviter
in his dissent, 134 Coale v. SocMt& Co-operative Suisse des Charbons'3I
held that a corporation formed by the Swiss Government for the im-
portation of coal was not exempt from jurisdiction even though the
Swiss Government appointed seven out of seventeen directors, main-
tained the right to approve the by-laws, and was entitled to all profits in
excess of six percent. In denying immunity to the defendant, the court
noted that "[i]f the Swiss government chose to do its business by means
of the Soci6t6, the latter, as a corporate entity, was liable for its corpo-
rate obligations. . . . The decisions hold that the corporation is liable
under such circumstances."'
136
In United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft,'37 also
pointed to by Judge Sloviter, t38 another district judge reached a similar
conclusion by rejecting the defense of sovereign immunity asserted by a
potash mining corporation owned and controlled by the French Gov-
ernment. The court indicated:
Neither principle nor precedent requires that this immunity, which,
as a matter of comity, is extended to a foreign sovereign and his am-
bassador, should be extended to a foreign corporation merely be-
cause some of its stock is held by a foreign state, or because it is
carrying on a commercial pursuit, which the foreign government re-
gards governmental or public.' 39
Numerous other courts have denied immunity to foreign government-
132. Rex, 493 F. Supp. at 466 n.6. See also Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529, 533 (reversing holding that bank was part of Nigerian State and
thus had sovereign immunity); Compania Naviera Vascongado v. S.S. "Christina," [1938]
A.C. 485, 521-22 (concurring that state-owned merchant ships must be granted immunity,
but protesting the "absurdity" of this position).
133. Rex, 660 F.2d at 72 (dissenting opinion); Note, Foreign Sovereign lnmmuniy-7-The
Status of Legal Entities in Socialist Countries as Defendants Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 165, 168 (1979). See generally 2 D.
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 872-76 (2d ed. 1970).
134. 660 F.2d at 72.
135. 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
136. Id at 181.
137. 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
138. 660 F.2d at 72.
139. 31 F.2d at 203.
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owned corporate defendants under similar reasoning. 40 Thus, the reli-
ance by the Rex, Williams, and Ruggiero courts on the immunity from
suit of the foreign government itself does not strengthen their position.
History indicates that even if foreign governments were immune from
suit, their corporate entities were not.
C. The Analogy Between Suits Against the United States and Suits
Against Foreign States
There are two primary reasons why the analogy between the im-
munity accorded the United States and that accorded foreign states is
inapt. First, corporations owned by the United States are legally dis-
tinct from their government owner and thus are not entitled to immu-
nity from suit or nonjury trials. 14 1 As Chief Justice Marshall explained
in Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia: "2
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government be-
comes a partner in any trading company, it devests [sic] itself, so far
as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign charac-
ter, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to
the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level
with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character
which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be
transacted .... As a member of a corporation, a government never
exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and exercises
no other power in the management of the affairs of the corporation,
than are expressly given by the incorporating act.'
4 3
Thus, because the defendants in the three instant cases are foreign
corporate entities, a straight analogy to the United States practice
defeats the argument presented by the Rex, Williams, and Ruggiero
courts.
Second, the sovereign immunity of the United States has its foun-
dation in constitutional and legal principles,'" whereas the immunity
140. See S.T. Tringali Co. v. The Tug Pemex XV, 274 F. Supp. 227 (S.D. Tex. 1967); The
Uxmal, 40 F. Supp. 258 (D. Mass. 1941); Commercial Pacific Cable Co. v. Philippine Na-
tional Bank, 263 F. 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1920); Ulen & Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 261
A.D. 1, 24 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1940). See also Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.,
306 U.S. 381 (1939); United States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491 (1921).
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976); Dellapenna, supra note 9, at 500.
142. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
143. I.d at 907-08.
144. Rex, 660 F.2d at 71 (dissenting opinion). See also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,
415 (1979) (the right to govern "necessarily encompass[es] the right to determine what suits
may be brought in the sovereign's own courts"); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,323-25
(1934) (founding fathers intended sovereign immunity to be part of constitutional scheme);
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accorded foreign governments rests upon "principles of public comity
and convenience."' 4 5 Thus, there is a stronger rationale supporting the
doctrine of domestic sovereign immunity. The practical considerations
which underlie the theory of foreign sovereign immunity are not signif-
icant enough to justify the elimination of jury trials when a foreign
government is sued.
V. CONCLUSION
In his dissent in Galloway v. United States, 46 Mr. Justice Black
criticized the "gradual process of judicial erosion which in one-hun-
dred-fifty years has slowly worn away a major portion of the essential
guarantee of the Seventh Amendment."' 147  The Rex, Williams, and
Ruggiero decisions unnecessarily contribute to this wearing away by
sustaining Congress denial of a jury trial to United States litigants su-
ing foreign government-owned corporations. Perhaps a circumvention
of the Seventh Amendment guarantee would be justified if the suits at
issue were maintained against foreign governments themselves. In the
instant cases, however, only government-owned corporations are in-
volved, and there appears to be little justification warranting such a
severe proscription on the Seventh Amendment guarantee to a jury
trial.
This Note has asserted that the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits
have improperly applied the standards set forth by the Supreme Court
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (sovereign immunity is based upon the
theory that one cannot proceed against the entity which establishes the legal right); Pflucger
v. United States, 121 F.2d 732, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ("the immunity of the sovereign from
suit is paramount, even over rights founded on the Constitution").
145. The Santissima Trinidad & The St. Andre, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353 (1822). See
National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 367 (1955) (Reed, J.,
dissenting). In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), the concept of sovereign immunity as it
applies to suits in the sovereign's own courts was distinguished from sovereign immunity as
it applies to suits in the courts of another sovereign:
Mr. Justice Holmes explained sovereign immunity as based "on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends."
This explanation adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be
sued in its own courts without its consent, but it affords no support for a claim of
immunity in another sovereign's courts. Such a claim necessarily implicates the
power and authority of a second sovereign; its source must be found either in an
agreement, express or implied, between the two sovereigns or in the voluntary deci-
sion of the second to respect the dignity of the first as a matter of comity.
Id at 415-16 (citation omitted).
146. 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
147. Id at 397.
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in Curtis4 ' and Pernell49 for determining the right to a jury trial in a
particular case. In addition, this Note has criticized the courts' failure
to distinguish between a foreign government and its corporate entities
in their development of a test focusing on the nature of the defendant
rather than on the nature of the rights and remedies at issue. Finally,
the courts' analogy of suits against foreign sovereign-owned corpora-
tions to suits against the United States was criticized. It is hoped that
the next court to consider the issue of whether a jury trial is required in
a suit against a foreign government-owned corporation will heed the
advice of Mr. Justice Sutherland:
[T]his court in a very special sense is charged with the duty of con-
struing and upholding the Constitution; and in the discharge of that
important duty, it ever must be alert to see that a doubtful precedent
be not extended by mere analogy to a different case if the result will
be to weaken or subvert what it conceives to be a principle of the
fundamental law of the land.150
Until the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury trial is either modi-
fied or abolished through constitutional process, it is the supreme law
of our land and should be zealously upheld by the courts, not whittled
away in the face of uncertain justification and precedent.
148. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
149. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
150. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485 (1935).
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